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categories: ["foundations", "society"]categories: ["foundations", "society"]tags: ["forecasting", "existential risk", "longtermism", "demography", "trajectories", "philosophy"]tags: ["forecasting", "existential risk", "longtermism", "demography", "trajectories", "philosophy"]summary: "The study of humanity's possible long-run trajectories, conventionally grouped into extinction, recurrent collapse, plateau, and posthuman transformation."summary: "The study of humanity's possible long-run trajectories, conventionally grouped into extinction, recurrent collapse, plateau, and posthuman transformation."updated: "2026-07-27"updated: "2026-10-29"issues: ["The demographic figures in keyfacts and the life-expectancy claim carry no footnote."]issues: ["The demographic figures in keyfacts and the life-expectancy claim carry no footnote."]------ lines 25–31 → 25–3111 unchanged lines not shown
}}`````` **Future of humanity** names the attempt to reason systematically about which long-run trajectories are open to the human species and its descendants, and how likely each is. It is not forecasting in the ordinary sense: the events at issue are unprecedented, the relevant timescales exceed any dataset, and the most consequential variables are the least predictable. What the field offers instead is a discipline of constraint — physical limits that no technology can exceed, historical base rates that any specific claim must beat, and a taxonomy that keeps arguments from talking past each other.**Future of humanity** names the attempt to reason systematically about which long-run trajectories are open to the human species and its descendants, and how likely each is. It is not forecasting in the ordinary sense: the events at issue are unprecedented, the relevant timescales exceed any dataset, and the most consequential variables are the least predictable. What the field offers instead is a discipline of constraint: physical limits that no technology can exceed, historical base rates that any specific claim must beat, and a taxonomy that keeps arguments from talking past each other. ```keyfacts```keyfacts[[lines 45–63 → 45–6313 unchanged lines not shown
**Plateau.** Development continues to some ceiling and stops there, with technology and human capacities remaining broadly at levels a person today would recognise. The plateau might be imposed by physics, by economics, or by deliberate global choice. It is the implicit assumption of most economic and demographic projection, and it is the scenario that receives the least explicit defence.**Plateau.** Development continues to some ceiling and stops there, with technology and human capacities remaining broadly at levels a person today would recognise. The plateau might be imposed by physics, by economics, or by deliberate global choice. It is the implicit assumption of most economic and demographic projection, and it is the scenario that receives the least explicit defence. **Posthumanity.** At least one central human capacity is raised far beyond its current maximum, producing beings that fall outside the current concept of human — the condition defined in [[posthuman]]. This family includes radically extended healthspan, greatly enhanced cognition, and non-biological substrates.**Posthumanity.** At least one central human capacity is raised far beyond its current maximum, producing beings that fall outside the current concept of human, the condition defined in [[posthuman]]. This family includes radically extended healthspan, greatly enhanced cognition, and non-biological substrates. The taxonomy is exhaustive by construction and says nothing about probability. Its value is in forcing an argument to specify which transition it is claiming, and what would have to be true for that transition to occur.The taxonomy is exhaustive by construction and says nothing about probability. Its value is in forcing an argument to specify which transition it is claiming, and what would have to be true for that transition to occur. ## What is reasonably well established## What is reasonably well established A short list of things about the next several decades is on firm ground, and it is worth separating from everything else in this article.A short list of claims about the next several decades rests on firm ground, and this section keeps it separate from everything else in the article. Global population growth is decelerating. Fertility has fallen below replacement in more than half of all countries, and standard projections show a peak around the 2080s followed by decline — a reversal of the assumption that shaped twentieth-century futurism, and one with direct bearing on the objection examined in [[overpopulation-and-longevity]]. Ageing populations, not growing ones, define the demographic problem of the next fifty years, which is the premise of the argument in [[longevity-dividend]].Global population growth is decelerating. Fertility has fallen below replacement in more than half of all countries, and standard projections show a peak around the 2080s followed by decline. That reverses the assumption that shaped twentieth-century futurism, and it has direct bearing on the objection examined in [[overpopulation-and-longevity]]. Ageing populations, not growing ones, define the demographic problem of the next fifty years, which is the premise of the argument in [[longevity-dividend]]. Health gains have shifted from mortality to morbidity. Global life expectancy at birth is around seventy-three years, most of the twentieth century's gains came from reducing early-life mortality, and further gains must come from late-life disease — where progress has been slower and where the [[compression-of-morbidity|compression of morbidity]] that some public-health models predict has not clearly materialised.Health gains have shifted from mortality to morbidity. Global life expectancy at birth is around seventy-three years, most of the twentieth century's gains came from reducing early-life mortality, and further gains must come from late-life disease. Progress there has been slower, and the [[compression-of-morbidity|compression of morbidity]] that some public-health models predict has not clearly materialised. Physical limits are calculable and binding. Energy budgets, waste-heat dissipation, the speed of light, and the accelerating expansion of the universe together bound what any civilisation can do; [[anders-sandberg]] and colleagues have argued that intergalactic settlement is not obviously ruled out by physics, while the reachable volume shrinks over cosmological time.[^armstrong2013] These constraints are among the few genuinely reliable inputs to long-horizon reasoning.Physical limits are calculable and binding. Energy budgets, waste-heat dissipation, the speed of light, and the accelerating expansion of the universe together bound what any civilisation can do; [[anders-sandberg]] and colleagues have argued that intergalactic settlement is not obviously ruled out by physics, while the reachable volume shrinks over cosmological time.[^armstrong2013] These constraints are among the few reliable inputs to long-horizon reasoning. Climate change is a well-characterised risk that is not, on mainstream assessment, an extinction risk. It is a large-scale harm to human welfare and ecosystems and a plausible contributor to instability, which is a different claim from civilisational termination and should not be merged with it.Climate change is a well-characterised risk that is not, on mainstream assessment, an extinction risk. It is a large-scale harm to human welfare and ecosystems and a plausible contributor to instability, which is a different claim from civilisational termination and should not be merged with it. lines 71–79 → 71–797 unchanged lines not shown
*Reproduction.* [[in-vitro-gametogenesis]] would, if it worked in humans, decouple gamete supply from the ovary and change the arithmetic of embryo selection completely. It works in mice. [[artificial-womb]] devices support extremely premature lambs and have not been tried in humans.*Reproduction.* [[in-vitro-gametogenesis]] would, if it worked in humans, decouple gamete supply from the ovary and change the arithmetic of embryo selection completely. It works in mice. [[artificial-womb]] devices support extremely premature lambs and have not been tried in humans. *Nervous systems.* [[brain-computer-interface|Brain–computer interfaces]] restore communication and control to people with paralysis at rates well below unimpaired function. They do not currently enhance healthy users, and the arguments for merging human and machine cognition rest on capabilities that do not exist.*Nervous systems.* [[brain-computer-interface|Brain-computer interfaces]] restore communication and control to people with paralysis at rates well below unimpaired function. They do not currently enhance healthy users, and the arguments for merging human and machine cognition rest on capabilities that do not exist. *Minds.* [[whole-brain-emulation]] and mind uploading depend on two premises — that the relevant causal structure is capturable by achievable imaging, and that mind is substrate-independent — which are respectable positions rather than established results. Most neuroscientists regard both as very distant.*Minds.* [[whole-brain-emulation]] and mind uploading depend on two premises: that the relevant causal structure is capturable by achievable imaging, and that mind is substrate-independent. Both are respectable positions rather than established results. Most neuroscientists regard both as very distant. *Bodies and matter.* [[organ-bioprinting]] and xenotransplantation address a defined shortage, with real clinical progress and unsolved problems in vascularisation and immunology. Nanomedicine has produced working DNA-based devices in the laboratory and nothing resembling the cell-scale machines proposed in the 1980s.*Bodies and matter.* [[organ-bioprinting]] and xenotransplantation address a defined shortage, with real clinical progress and unsolved problems in vascularisation and immunology. Nanomedicine has produced working DNA-based devices in the laboratory and nothing resembling the cell-scale machines proposed in the 1980s. lines 82–96 → 82–962 unchanged lines not shown
*Machine intelligence.* [[artificial-general-intelligence]] is the lever most likely to change the others, because it acts on research productivity rather than on any single problem. It is also the one whose timeline is least constrained by evidence.*Machine intelligence.* [[artificial-general-intelligence]] is the lever most likely to change the others, because it acts on research productivity rather than on any single problem. It is also the one whose timeline is least constrained by evidence. > [!key] The asymmetry between levers> [!key] The asymmetry between levers> Every lever above except machine intelligence has a bounded effect on a specific system. AI is the only candidate that could plausibly compound the rate at which the others advance, which is why AGI timelines dominate every serious long-horizon estimate — and why the weakness of the evidence about them propagates into everything else.> Every lever above except machine intelligence has a bounded effect on a specific system. AI is the only candidate that could plausibly compound the rate at which the others advance, which is why AGI timelines dominate every serious long-horizon estimate, and why the weakness of the evidence about them propagates into everything else. ## The risks## The risks The case for treating this as urgent rather than academic rests on the claim that anthropogenic risks now exceed natural ones by a wide margin. Toby Ord's survey estimates roughly a one-in-six chance of existential catastrophe this century, dominated by unaligned artificial intelligence and engineered pandemics, with natural risks such as asteroid impact and supervolcanism orders of magnitude smaller.[^ord2020] The estimates are explicitly subjective and have been criticised as unfalsifiable; the *ranking* is more robust than the numbers, since natural risk rates can be estimated from the geological record and have evidently been low enough to permit two hundred thousand years of human existence.The case for treating this as urgent rather than academic rests on the claim that anthropogenic risks now exceed natural ones by a wide margin. Toby Ord's survey estimates roughly a one-in-six chance of existential catastrophe this century, dominated by unaligned artificial intelligence and engineered pandemics, with natural risks such as asteroid impact and supervolcanism orders of magnitude smaller.[^ord2020] The estimates are explicitly subjective and have been criticised as unfalsifiable; the *ranking* is more reliable than the numbers, since natural risk rates can be estimated from the geological record and have evidently been low enough to permit two hundred thousand years of human existence. Engineered pathogens are the clearest biological case, and the mechanisms are covered under [[dual-use-research|dual-use research of concern]] and [[mirror-life]]. Martin Rees's earlier assessment reached a similar conclusion about the century by a different route, emphasising the falling cost and rising accessibility of destructive capability.Engineered pathogens are the clearest biological case, and the mechanisms are covered under [[dual-use-research|dual-use research of concern]] and [[mirror-life]]. Martin Rees's earlier assessment reached a similar conclusion about the century by a different route, emphasising the falling cost and rising accessibility of destructive capability. The countervailing observation is that the field has a systematic bias toward the dramatic. Slow trajectories — declining fertility, entrenched inequality, institutional decay, value lock-in through durable technology — are less discussed than sudden ones, and there is no reason to think they matter less.The countervailing observation is that the field has a systematic bias toward the dramatic. Slow trajectories, such as declining fertility, entrenched inequality, institutional decay and value lock-in through durable technology, are less discussed than sudden ones, and there is no reason to think they matter less. ## Reasoning across long horizons## Reasoning across long horizons lines 105–117 → 105–1178 unchanged lines not shown
**Distinguish demonstrated from extrapolated.** The recurring failure in this literature is treating mouse results, laboratory demonstrations and design studies as though they were positions on a timeline rather than facts about what has been done. Maturity scales such as the technology readiness levels used throughout this wiki are a blunt instrument for this, and better than nothing.**Distinguish demonstrated from extrapolated.** The recurring failure in this literature is treating mouse results, laboratory demonstrations and design studies as though they were positions on a timeline rather than facts about what has been done. Maturity scales such as the technology readiness levels used throughout this wiki are a blunt instrument for this, and better than nothing. > [!caution] What the record shows> [!caution] What the record shows> Confident long-horizon technology predictions have been wrong in both directions and at roughly comparable rates. Nuclear energy, space settlement and machine translation were all over-forecast in the mid-twentieth century; the internet, genomic sequencing costs and [[ai-protein-design|protein structure prediction]] were all under-forecast. The lesson is not that optimists are wrong but that specific dates carry almost no information.> Confident long-horizon technology predictions have been wrong in both directions and at roughly comparable rates. Nuclear energy, space settlement and machine translation were all over-forecast in the mid-twentieth century; the internet, genomic sequencing costs and [[ai-protein-design|protein structure prediction]] were all under-forecast. The lesson is that specific dates carry almost no information, rather than that optimists are wrong. ## Where the disagreements actually are## Where the disagreements lie Participants agree on far more than the public argument suggests. Nearly everyone accepts that the technologies covered here are physically possible in some form, that timelines are uncertain, and that irreversible outcomes deserve extra weight. The live disputes are narrower.Participants agree on far more than the public argument suggests. Nearly everyone accepts that the technologies covered here are physically possible in some form, that timelines are uncertain, and that irreversible outcomes deserve extra weight. The live disputes are narrower. *How much do we owe the far future?* Longtermist arguments hold that the number of potential future people is so large that reducing existential risk dominates other priorities. Critics object that this reasoning is dominated by tiny probabilities of enormous values, and that it licenses present sacrifices for speculative benefit.*How much is owed to the far future?* Longtermist arguments hold that the number of potential future people is so large that reducing existential risk dominates other priorities. Critics object that this reasoning is dominated by tiny probabilities of enormous values, and that it licenses present sacrifices for speculative benefit. *Is technological progress the right lever?* Transhumanists and accelerationists treat capability growth as the primary route to good outcomes. Bioconservatives and the [[precautionary-principle]] tradition hold that some capabilities should not be developed. A third position proposes to alter the ordering of arrivals rather than the total, which most participants nominally endorse and few institutions implement.*Is technological progress the right lever?* Transhumanists and accelerationists treat capability growth as the primary route to good outcomes. Bioconservatives and the [[precautionary-principle]] tradition hold that some capabilities should not be developed. A third position proposes to alter the ordering of arrivals rather than the total, which most participants nominally endorse and few institutions implement. lines 121–131 → 121–1313 unchanged lines not shown
Three problems are unresolved and structurally hard rather than merely unfinished.Three problems are unresolved and structurally hard rather than merely unfinished. The **plateau's mechanism** is undertheorised. If neither collapse nor transformation occurs, something must be holding development at a ceiling for a very long time, and no one has described what. The scenario receives the least attention precisely because it is the least interesting to argue about, which is a poor reason.The **plateau's mechanism** is undertheorised. If neither collapse nor transformation occurs, something must be holding development at a ceiling for a very long time, and no one has described what. The scenario receives the least attention because it is the least interesting to argue about, which is a poor reason to neglect it. The **evidence base for probability estimates** does not exist. Numbers like one in six are elicited judgements presented in the notation of measurement, and the field has not developed a method for improving them that is testable within a human lifetime. Forecasting tournaments have shown short-horizon skill; nothing shows that skill extends to century-scale questions about unprecedented events.The **evidence base for probability estimates** does not exist. Numbers like one in six are elicited judgements presented in the notation of measurement, and the field has not developed a method for improving them that is testable within a human lifetime. Forecasting tournaments have shown short-horizon skill; nothing shows that skill extends to century-scale questions about unprecedented events. The **observer selection problem** is unsolved and it undermines the most common empirical argument. That humanity has survived every past hazard tells us little, because we could not be here to observe otherwise — so the historical record cannot distinguish a safe world from a lucky one, and the sharpest disagreement in the field is over how much that consideration should move any estimate.The **observer selection problem** is unsolved and it undermines the most common empirical argument. That humanity has survived every past hazard says little, because no one could be here to observe otherwise. The historical record therefore cannot distinguish a safe world from a lucky one, and the sharpest disagreement in the field is over how much that consideration should move any estimate. ## See also## See also removed, struck through added, underlinedLine numbers count the serialised markdown of each revision, frontmatter included.
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