Julian Savulescu: revision 2 to 3

Revision 2

Revision 3

categories: ["people", "society"]

tags: ["bioethics", "enhancement", "embryo selection", "moral enhancement", "philosophy"]

summary: "Australian bioethicist who formulated procreative beneficence and, with Ingmar Persson, the argument for moral bioenhancement; the leading academic advocate of human enhancement."

summary: "Australian bioethicist who formulated procreative beneficence and, with Ingmar Persson, the argument for moral bioenhancement; the leading academic advocate of human enhancement."

updated: "2026-08-23"

updated: "2026-10-29"

---

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select the children expected to have the best lives, that enhancement is continuous with medicine

rather than opposed to it, and that humanity's moral capacities are now the binding constraint on

its technological ones. Trained as a physician and as a philosopher under Peter Singer, he has been

the most systematic academic defender of [[human-enhancement]] since the early 2000s, and the

the most systematic academic defender of [[human-enhancement]] since the early 2000s, and the figure

figure whose arguments [[bioconservatism|bioconservative]] critics most often answer.

whose arguments [[bioconservatism|bioconservative]] critics most often answer.

## Career

working on rationality and end-of-life decision-making. He took the Uehiro Chair in Practical Ethics

at Oxford in 2002 and founded and directed the Oxford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics, which

became the main European base for analytic work on enhancement, neuroethics and research ethics. He

edited the *Journal of Medical Ethics* for close to two decades. In August 2022 he moved his

edited the *Journal of Medical Ethics* for close to two decades. In August 2022 he moved his primary

primary post to the National University of Singapore, where he is the Chen Su Lan Centennial

post to the National University of Singapore, where he is the Chen Su Lan Centennial Professor in

Professor in Medical Ethics and directs its Centre for Biomedical Ethics, while retaining Oxford

Medical Ethics and directs its Centre for Biomedical Ethics. He retains Oxford and Melbourne

and Melbourne affiliations, including a biomedical ethics group at the Murdoch Children's Research

affiliations, including a biomedical ethics group at the Murdoch Children's Research

Institute.[^nus2022]

His output is unusually broad for the field: embryo selection, doping, organ donation, conscientious

His output is unusually broad for the field. It covers embryo selection, doping, organ donation,

objection by clinicians, the ethics of research in emergencies, and the ethics of pandemic

conscientious objection by clinicians, the ethics of research in emergencies, and the ethics of

response — with Dominic Wilkinson he edited *Pandemic Ethics: From COVID-19 to Disease X*

pandemic response; on the last, he and Dominic Wilkinson edited *Pandemic Ethics: From COVID-19 to

(2023).[^pw2023]

Disease X* (2023).[^pw2023]

## Procreative beneficence

The 2001 paper that made his name states a principle: couples who select embryos or gametes should

select the child, of the possible children they could have, expected to have the best life, or at

least as good a life as the others, on the basis of relevant available information.[^savulescu2001]

The principle is deliberately narrow. It applies only where selection is already occurring, it does

The principle is deliberately narrow. It applies only where selection is already occurring and does

not license coercion, and it concerns non-person-affecting choices — the child selected is a

not license coercion. It also concerns non-person-affecting choices, because the child selected is a

different individual from the one who would otherwise have existed, which is why the

[[procreative-beneficence|non-identity problem]] does so much work in the surrounding literature.

Savulescu extends the principle beyond disease traits to any characteristic that improves expected

wellbeing, which is where the disagreement begins. If a test predicts a small advantage in some

wellbeing, and that is where the disagreement begins. If a test predicts a small advantage in some

trait, the principle appears to make selection on it obligatory rather than optional — a conclusion

trait, the principle appears to make selection on it obligatory rather than optional, a conclusion

critics find either objectionable or a reductio. The argument has become directly practical with

critics find either objectionable or a reductio. The argument has become directly practical with the

the arrival of [[polygenic-embryo-screening]], which produces exactly the sort of probabilistic

arrival of [[polygenic-embryo-screening]], which produces exactly the sort of probabilistic trait

trait information the principle takes as input; Savulescu has argued that the resulting obligations

information the principle takes as input. Savulescu has argued that the resulting obligations are

are modest because the predicted gains are small, while objecting to bans on the technology as such.

modest because the predicted gains are small, while objecting to bans on the technology as such.

> [!debate] The strongest objection

> Disability-rights scholars argue that selecting against a trait expresses a judgement about people

> living with it. Savulescu's reply relies on a welfarist account of disability — a condition is a

> living with it. Savulescu's reply relies on a welfarist account of disability, in which a

> disability if it reduces expected wellbeing in the circumstances, not because it deviates from a

> condition is a disability if it reduces expected wellbeing in the circumstances, not because it

> norm — which critics say relocates the judgement rather than removing it. See

> deviates from a norm. Critics say this relocates the judgement rather than removing it. See

> [[disability-rights-and-enhancement]].

## Moral bioenhancement

With Ingmar Persson, Savulescu argues that human moral psychology evolved for small groups with

limited technology, and is poorly suited to a world where a few individuals can cause catastrophic

harm.[^ps2008] Cognitive enhancement in this framing is dangerous on its own, because it increases

harm.[^ps2008] In this framing, cognitive enhancement on its own is dangerous, because it increases

the capacity for harm without improving the disposition to avoid it. The proposed response is

research into biomedical means of strengthening altruism and a sense of justice — the illustrative

research into biomedical means of strengthening altruism and a sense of justice. The illustrative

candidates in the literature being oxytocin, serotonergic drugs and beta-blockers, none of which

candidates in the literature are oxytocin, serotonergic drugs and beta-blockers, none of which does

does anything close to what the argument requires. Their 2012 book *Unfit for the Future* connects

anything close to what the argument requires. Their 2012 book *Unfit for the Future* connects the

the argument to [[existential-risk]].

argument to [[existential-risk]].

The obvious objections have been pressed hard. John Harris argued that moral enhancement, if

effective, would remove the freedom to do wrong that makes moral action valuable.[^harris2011]

Others ask who specifies the target morality, and note that any state with the capacity to

administer moral enhancement is the last actor that should be trusted with it. Savulescu and

administer moral enhancement is the last actor that should be trusted with it. Savulescu and Persson

Persson's response distinguishes enhancing dispositions from determining choices, and accepts that

respond by distinguishing the enhancement of dispositions from the determination of choices, and

compulsory application would be illegitimate. The empirical position is weaker than the

they accept that compulsory application would be illegitimate. The empirical position is weaker than

philosophical one: no intervention has been shown to produce durable, general improvements in moral

the philosophical one: no intervention has been shown to produce durable, general improvements in

behaviour. See [[moral-enhancement]].

moral behaviour. See [[moral-enhancement]].

## Sport and doping

Savulescu has argued that the anti-doping regime is incoherent — it permits altitude tents,

Savulescu has argued that the anti-doping regime is incoherent, because it permits altitude tents,

hypoxic chambers and extensive pharmacological recovery while banning functionally similar

interventions — and that a safety-based regulatory model, monitoring physiological parameters

interventions. A safety-based regulatory model that monitors physiological parameters instead of

rather than prohibiting substances, would protect athletes better than prohibition does.[^sav2004]

prohibiting substances would, he argues, protect athletes better than prohibition does.[^sav2004]

The position is a minority one among sports physicians and anti-doping bodies, and it has become

more salient with the emergence of openly enhanced competition formats. See

more salient with the emergence of openly enhanced competition formats. See [[enhancement-in-sport]]

[[enhancement-in-sport]] and [[gene-doping]].

and [[gene-doping]].

## Reception

The Uehiro Centre under Savulescu's direction trained a generation of researchers now working on

neuroethics, AI ethics and enhancement. His method is characteristically

neuroethics, AI ethics and enhancement. His method is characteristically analytic. He states a

analytic: state a principle, follow it to conclusions most readers dislike, and treat the discomfort

principle, follows it to conclusions most readers dislike, and treats the discomfort as data about

as data about the principle rather than a reason to abandon it. Admirers regard this as intellectual

the principle rather than a reason to abandon it. Admirers regard this as intellectual seriousness.

seriousness. Critics regard the same trait as a willingness to reach eugenic-sounding conclusions

Critics see in the same trait a willingness to reach eugenic-sounding conclusions through formally

through formally valid steps, and note that his arguments almost always assume a regulatory and

valid steps, and note that his arguments almost always assume a regulatory and economic environment

economic environment in which access is fair — an assumption addressed at length in

in which access is fair, an assumption addressed at length in [[access-and-inequality]].

[[access-and-inequality]].

He is on the opposite side of most debates from [[leon-kass]], and the two positions define the

range of serious argument in [[bioethics-of-enhancement]]: whether the given human form has moral

## Legacy

The practical test of Savulescu's programme is arriving now. [[embryo-selection]] on polygenic

Savulescu's programme now faces a practical test. [[embryo-selection]] on polygenic scores is

scores is commercially available and unregulated in several jurisdictions;

commercially available and unregulated in several jurisdictions. [[in-vitro-gametogenesis]], if it

[[in-vitro-gametogenesis]], if it works in humans, would remove the constraint that a cycle yields

works in humans, would remove the constraint that a cycle yields only a handful of embryos, and the

only a handful of embryos and would make the principle of procreative beneficence bind much harder.

principle of procreative beneficence would then bind much harder. Savulescu has consistently held

Savulescu has been consistent that the resulting decisions belong to prospective parents rather than

that the resulting decisions belong to prospective parents rather than states. Whether a technology

states. Whether a technology that makes his principle powerful also makes it acceptable is a

that makes his principle powerful also makes it acceptable is a question his framework poses more

question his framework poses more sharply than it answers.

sharply than it answers.

## See also